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Freedom of Religion at the Supreme 
Court in 2009: Multiculturalism  
at the Crossroads? 
Nathalie Des Rosiers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Religious toleration has meaning only when it leads to the accep-
tance of decisions that one finds unpalatable or incomprehensible. 
Otherwise, when religious toleration only means respect for differences 
within a generally acceptable spectrum of options, it requires no constitu-
tional protection. It is because a majority may feel compelled to act 
against a minority, may feel sufficiently irritated, repelled or dismissive 
of a minority, that constitutional protection is needed. Justice Binnie in 
his dissent in C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Ser-
vices) puts it this way: “The Charter1 is not just about the freedom to 
make what most members of society would regard as the wise and cor-
rect choice. If that were the case, the Charter would be superfluous.”2  
If freedom of religion were analyzed in a way that most resembles 
the protection we afford speech,3 the above would aptly describe the state 
of the law on freedom of religion in Canada, but it does not. In this paper, 
I attempt to explain why freedom of religion has more to do with an am-
bivalent commitment to multiculturalism than a devotion to freedom of 
conscience, and why as the commitment to multiculturalism is declining, 
                                                                                                             
*
 General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association; Professor, Faculty of Law, Civil 
Law Section, University of Ottawa, on leave. I want to thank Christian Pearce and Billeh Hamud for 
their help with the research for this article. The errors and omissions are mine. 
1
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, at para. 163 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.).”]. 
3
 There is no point in protecting speech one agrees with, one must be prepared to defend 
the right to speak of people with whom one disagrees vehemently. As described in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 968 (S.C.C.):  
Freedom of expression was entrenched in our Constitution and is guaranteed in the Que-
bec Charter so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, 
indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary 
to the mainstream. 
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so is the protection for freedom of religion. In an article published in 
1993, Jacques Zylberberg and Pauleen Côté suggested that “[t]olerance, 
more than freedom of conscience”4 facilitated the establishment of non-
Christian communities in the colonial origins of the Confederation. In 
my view, the linkage between ideas about multiculturalism, the will to 
live peacefully “with” the other, has continued to anchor the aspirations 
to recognize freedom of religion throughout Canadian history, despite the 
experience of discrimination for many communities. A discourse of tol-
erance has supported the judicial recognition of freedom of religion. 
When the commitment to tolerance is waning, the understanding of free-
dom of religion appears wanting.  
This paper begins with a brief review of the judicial treatment of 
freedom of religion and its link to multiculturalism, tolerance and  
majority-minorities relationships. It then analyzes the Supreme Court of 
Canada pronouncements on freedom of religion in 2009 in light of this 
history and, in particular, discusses the decision in Alberta v. Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony.5 A second case, C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director 
of Child and Family Services)6 dealt also with freedom of religion to a 
lesser extent; it will be referenced at times but deserves a longer assess-
ment in the context of age discrimination and the treatment of children 
and mature minors.  
The link between protection for individual or collective freedoms 
and diversity is not new. Freedom allows for a diversity of opinion and 
lifestyles, which is the enrichment that democracies count on. Because of 
the freedom to experiment with thought, innovation is fostered. Because 
of the freedom to be left alone, deeper reflection is enhanced. Because of 
the freedom to believe in different creeds, critical discussions and self-
analysis can occur. In the two cases discussed here, one could say that 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ criticism of the medical profession and use of 
blood transfusions has enriched Canadian life by demanding the explora-
tion of alternative medical treatments. Canadian society is also enriched 
by the Hutterian Brethren’s refusal to be photographed and their criticism 
of Western society’s vanity and obsession with looks. In addition, the 
Hutterian Brethren’s skepticism toward the necessity and efficiency of a 
                                                                                                             
4
 Jacques Zylberberg & Pauline Côté, « Les balises étatiques de la religion au Canada », 
(1993) 40 Social Compass 529, at 531 : « La tolérance, plus qua la liberté de conscience, facilitera 
l’établissement, dans la colonie puis dans les dominions, de différentes autres collectivités par 
exemple juives, baptistes et mormones... ». 
5
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.), [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. 
6
 Supra, note 2. 
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digital photo bank also raises helpful debates. In a way, protecting free-
dom of religion fosters diversity and multiculturalism, and when less 
protection is offered, less diversity is to be expected. 
After the brief review of Canadian history of freedom of religion and 
its link to ideas of multiculturalism (Part II), I analyze the 2009 judicial 
pronouncements in light of this history suggesting a pessimistic assess-
ment of their impact on freedom of religion and multicultural tolerance 
(Part III) by commenting principally on three issues: (1) the acceptance 
of secondary purposes under section 1 of the Charter; (2) the rejection of 
the accommodation framework; and (3) the discounting of marginal be-
liefs. It is my hope that the decision in Hutterian Brethren will not signal 
a fundamental shift in the Canadian jurisprudence on freedom of  
religion; however, in my view, there is reason to be concerned.  
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND MULTICULTURALISM 
Freedom of religion decisions may be analyzed in multiple ways: 
they represent a form of freedom of expression since they protect the 
way one expresses one’s spirituality. Freedom of religion is also a form 
of freedom of association as one defines one’s belonging to an organized 
community with shared beliefs. One could also analyze religion as a col-
lective right:7 the way in which the institutions of religion are needed to 
provide the range of support for the experience of religious people and 
the way in which it provides the right for some groups to religious 
schooling (section 93 of the Constitution Act, 18678). Finally, in Canada, 
freedom of religion has always had strong anti-discrimination and equal-
ity undertones, that is, the tension between majority religions and 
minority religions has always been at the core of the protection of free-
dom of religion. José Woehrling and Richard Moon have argued that this 
focus on equality creates confusion.9 Nevertheless, the Canadian context 
presupposes a sensibility to equality in the context of the assessment of 
religious freedoms. Canada attempted to develop a model of religious 
toleration but lived and reproduced religious discrimination. The struggle 
                                                                                                             
7
 Janet Epp Buckingham, “Drivers Needed: Tough Choices from Alberta v. Wilson Colony 
of Hutterian Brethren” (2010) 18 Const. Forum 109 [hereinafter “Buckingham”]. 
8
 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
9
 José Woehrling, “La place de la religion dans les écoles publiques du Québec” (2007) 41 
R.J.T. 651, at 655; Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 201; Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Reli-
gious Freedom Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 41 Brandeis L.J. 563. 
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to develop a way to live together “with” religious minorities explains 
Canadian history, which like other countries, has been marked by reli-
gious conflicts, albeit less bloody: the desire to convert “pagans” 
underpinned the disastrous assumptions about assimilation of Aboriginal 
people; the opposition between Catholics and Protestants motivated in 
part the deportation of the Acadians;10 the Quebec Act could be analyzed 
as a first gesture of religious accommodation11 where the King of Eng-
land accepted that in Canada and only in Canada, Catholics would not 
have to take the Oath of Allegiance.12 The framework for the arrange-
ments in 1867 is strongly impregnated with an attempt to manage 
religious diversity. Despite the desire to have a constitution in the image 
of Great Britain, there was a pragmatic tolerance of the Catholic religion.  
The beginning of the colony was marked by the alliance between 
Christian religions and governmental elites who worked together for 
many purposes, from the assimilation of indigenous people to the devel-
opment of colonization and the integration of new immigrant groups. 
Over time, freedom of religion became understood as a way to extend the 
privileges granted to Christian groups to other religions. This link between 
cultural tolerance and freedom of religion seems evident in its first legal 
articulation: the presence and desire to live “with” a French Canadian mi-
nority strongly linked to the Catholic religion calls for an idea of religion 
as intimately linked to the idea of cultural tolerance and the desire to live 
together. Nevertheless, religious discrimination is also a well-known fact 
of our history: from Canadian anti-Semitism13 to the persecution of  
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 Maurice A. Léger, “La déportation et la religion”, in Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc, ed., Du 
grand dérangement à la déportation : Nouvelles perspectives historiques (Moncton : Chaire d’études 
acadiennes, 2005) 105, at 129; James Laxer, The Acadians: In Search of a Homeland (Toronto: 
Doubleday Canada, 2006), at 89-96. 
11
 Hilda Neatby, Quebec: The Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791 (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1966), at 125-41, makes that point according to John McLaren, “The Doukhobor Belief in 
Individual Faith and Conscience and the Demands of the Secular State” in John McLaren & Harold 
Coward, eds., Religious Conscience, the State, and the Law: Historical Contexts and Contemporary 
Significance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), at 134, note 60 [hereinafter 
“McLaren, ‘The Doukhobor Belief’”]. Quebec Act, 1774 (U.K.), 14 Geo. III, c. 83. 
12
 Micheline Milot, “Les principes de laïcité politique au Québec et au Canada” (2005) 13 
Bulletin d’histoire politique 13. 
13
 See Irving Abella & Harold Troper, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 
1933-1948, 3d ed. (Toronto: Key Porter, 2000), at 340; Noble v. Alley, [1951] S.C.J. No. 34, [1951] 
S.C.R. 64 (S.C.C.). See also William W. Black, “Religion and the Right of Equality” in Anne Bayef-
sky & Mary Eberts, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1985) 131. 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MULTICULTURALISM AT THE CROSSROADS? 77 
religious minorities such as the Doukhobors,14 the Hutterites15 and the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.16  
It is therefore not surprising that early iterations of the rule of law in 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis17 were articulated in a context of religious dis-
crimination, already denounced in Saumur v. Quebec (City)18 and Chaput 
v. Romain.19 In this latter decision, Taschereau J. evokes the links be-
tween freedom of religion and privacy, between freedom of religion and 
freedom of conscience, and between freedom of religion and tolerance 
for religious minorities. His words encapsulate the complexity of the pro-
tection to be given to freedom of religion:  
In our country there is no state religion. Nobody is obliged to adhere to 
any belief. All religions are equal, and all Catholics and indeed all 
Protestants, Jews and other adherents of various religious 
denominations, have the greatest freedom to think as they wish. The 
consciousness of each is a personal matter and the concern of nobody 
else. It would be distressing to think that a majority can impose its 
religious views on a minority. It would be an unfortunate mistake to 
believe that serving your country or religion, by denying in a province, 
a minority the same rights that we claim ourselves with reason, in 
another province.20  
The “accommodation of religious minorities” model followed the 
early recognition of the necessity of tolerance for minorities: adjustments 
to work schedules21 were made. In hospitals or prisons, special meals were 
offered22 and alterations to uniforms23 were also implemented. From the 
beginning, it was anticipated that the issue of “accommodation” might be 
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 McLaren, “The Doukhobor Belief”, supra, note 11; William Janzen, Limits on Liberty: 
The Experience of Mennonite, Hutterite and Doukhobor Communities in Canada (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1990) [hereinafter “Janzen”]. 
15
 Janzen, id.  
16
 William Kaplan, State and Salvation: The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Fight For Civil 
Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). 
17
 [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.). 
18
 [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.). 
19
 [1955] S.C.J. No. 61, [1955] S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.). 
20
 Id., at 840 (translation). 
21
 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Simpsons Sears”]; Central Okanagan School District 
No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] S.C.J. No. 75, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (S.C.C.). 
22
 Pierre Bosset, “Le régime alimentaire des détenus de foi hébraïque : obligations des auto-
rités carcérales”, Québec Human Rights Commission (May 1991), online : <http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca 
/fr/publications/docs/aliments_hebraique.pdf>. 
23
 Grant v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1001, [1995] 1 F.C. 158 (F.C.A.), 
affd [1995] F.C.J. No. 830 F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 394 (S.C.C.). 
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difficult. Justice McIntyre in Simpsons Sears, seems to aptly predict the 
current debates:  
No problem is found with the proposition that a person should be free 
to adopt any religion he or she may choose and to observe the tenets of 
that faith. This general concept of freedom of religion has been 
well-established in our society and was a recognized and protected 
right long before the human rights codes of recent appearance were 
enacted. Difficulty arises when the question is posed of how far the 
person in entitled to go in the exercise of his religious freedom. At what 
point in the profession of his faith and the observance of its rules does 
he go beyond the mere exercise of his rights and seek to enforce upon 
others conformance with his beliefs?24  
In the context of the Charter, more ambitious statements were voiced 
attempting to define a “freedom analysis”, nevertheless grounded in a 
recognition of the value of diversity. The words of Dickson J. (as he then 
was) in Big M Drug Mart exemplify this:  
A truly free society can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, 
diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct. A free 
society is one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of 
fundamental freedoms and I say this without any reliance upon s. 15 of 
the Charter.25  
Perhaps the most ambitious “freedom of religion as freedom” state-
ment comes when Dickson J. goes on to explain:  
Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and 
the inviolable rights of the human person. The essence of the concept of 
freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without 
fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief 
by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the 
concept means more than that. 
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion 
or constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another 
to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have 
chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be 
truly free. One of the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within 
reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only such 
                                                                                                             
24
 Supra, note 21, at para. 21. 
25
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 94 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Big M Drug Mart”]. 
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blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from 
acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control 
which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to 
others. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of 
coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. 
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary 
to his beliefs or his conscience.26 
Despite these auspicious words, soon enough public objectives 
would be argued to curtail individuals’ and groups’ assertions of religious 
freedom. For example, determining a holiday day more convenient for 
everyone (Sunday) was an appropriate objective in Edwards Books and 
Art,27 where the Court seemed to accept a wider sphere of discretion for 
governments to determine “public safety, order, health, or morals”. In my 
view, the McLachlin Court was initially quite critical of “majoritarian” 
justifications: refusing aesthetic objectives in Syndicat Northcrest v. Am-
selem28 or security ones in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys29 (albeit in the two cases, the justifications were not articu-
lated by governments, but by private actors in Amselem and a public 
authority — a school board — in Multani). The Court equally pursued an 
agenda of tolerance and respect in Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia College of Teachers,30 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District 
No. 3631 and in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-
Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village).32  
Freedom of religion is an interesting terrain of exploration of  
majority-minorities conflicts, as an expression of a respect for diversity. I 
have argued that courts generally feel comfortable in this role of arbiter 
between majority and minorities, because it means acting as the refuge 
against the “tyranny of the majority”, an acceptable role for courts sensi-
                                                                                                             
26
 Id., at paras. 94-95 (emphasis added). 
27
 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Edwards Books”]. 
28
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem”]. 
29
 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”].  
30
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Trinity Western”]. 
31
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chamberlain”]. 
32
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Congrégation St-
Jérôme”]. 
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tive to criticisms of excessive activism.33 This role of arbiter requires a 
sensibility to power imbalances, a will to understand in a non-judgmental 
way the minority’s point of view and a capacity to assess critically the 
majority’s concerns. In my view, the Supreme Court has often practised 
that role of arbiter between majority and minorities. A fair representation 
of this arbiter role can be found in the decision in the Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec34 and, in general, can be seen as a way to explain freedom 
of religion cases.  
Among other things, this analysis of the courts as arbiter between 
minorities and majority explains one of the most controversial aspects of 
freedom of religion: the refusal to define the content of religion. The de-
cision in Amselem35 has generated criticism because it opened the door to 
what some say are idiosyncratic minority religious obligations. It will be 
recalled that, in the case, the practice of installing a succah was at issue: 
it is not a compulsory practice in Judaism and therefore it was possible to 
maintain a religious affiliation while obeying the requirements of the 
condominium contract not to erect any structure on the balcony. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court recognized the freedom of believers to define 
the content of their faith and of their religious obligations. Indeed, ac-
cording to Iacobucci J.:  
… an individual advancing an issue premised upon a freedom of 
religion claim must show the court that (1) he or she has a practice or 
belief, having a nexus with religion, which calls for a particular line of 
conduct, either by being objectively or subjectively obligatory or 
customary, or by, in general, subjectively engendering a personal 
connection with the divine … irrespective of whether a particular 
practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in 
conformity with the position of religious officials; and (2) he or she is 
sincere in his or her belief.36 
The recognition of this subjective conception of the relationship with 
the divine has raised fears of the emergence of far-fetched beliefs and 
practices. However, the decision to maintain the more subjective concept 
                                                                                                             
33
 Nathalie Des Rosiers, « Le poids de l’histoire : les années McLachlin et la liberté de reli-
gion », in David A. Wright and Adam M. Dodek, Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First 
Decade (forthcoming). 
34
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of some of these 
ideas, see Nathalie Des Rosiers, “From Québec Veto to Québec Secession: The Evolution of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on Québec-Canada Disputes” (2000) 13 Can. J. Law & Juris. 171. 
35
 Supra, note 28. 
36
 Id., at para. 56. 
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of freedom of religion can be explained in several ways: it is a design 
that closely resembles the “freedom” aspect. Indeed, just as courts try to 
recognize a broad interpretation of the freedom of expression and to ana-
lyze its limits in the context of section 1 of the Charter, rather than as part 
of an ontological exercise of what expression is, one may think that free-
dom of religion should equally avoid asking an exact definition of what 
religion is, especially, as pointed out by Iacobucci J., when this defini-
tional exercise would put the courts in the middle of ecclesiastical 
debates.  
I also believe that this subjective interpretation allows the minority 
member and the minority community to express its expectations and 
ways of seeing without being subject to the need for external objectifica-
tion. In a way, it enables the expression of the minority group’s 
difference without having to justify the nature of this difference, its ori-
gins or ramifications. Such an interpretation of freedom of religion is 
understandable in a context of minorities-majority relations in which it is 
important to allow the minority to articulate for itself its aspirations be-
fore they are circumscribed or appropriated by the justifications of the 
majority. It does not give carte blanche to minorities nor require that all 
their demands be accepted but it does create a listening space where ex-
changes are possible. The study of the negotiations or exchanges between 
minority-majority — regardless of the type of minority, be they cultural, 
political, linguistic or religious — reveals a need for room for the expres-
sion of the “interest” by the minority. When the majority speaks for the 
minority, when members of majority religions or secular beliefs define 
the mandatory content of minority religions, the risk of stereotyping is 
always present. Although a subjective content of religion can lead to ex-
aggerated or individual interpretations that go well beyond the ways of 
life of a minority group, it is preferable to uphold this broad interpreta-
tion rather than a narrow interpretation requiring external validation. The 
real debate should not be held under the definition of freedom of religion 
but in the context of the justifications offered to limit its exercise pursu-
ant to section 1 of the Charter. 
Under section 1, one would hope for the court to be skeptical toward 
majoritarian explanations in order to allow for the protection against tyr-
anny. Multani37 is certainly the most controversial38 decision of the past 
                                                                                                             
37
 Supra, note 29. 
38
 The decision may have been a trigger for the media furor surrounding reasonable ac-
commodation in Quebec that prompted the establishment of the Bouchard Taylor Commission, 
otherwise known as the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
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decade despite the fact that it seemed to come squarely within the tradi-
tion of Simpsons Sears.39 In fact, the findings of the trial judge were quite 
clear about the need for tolerance and a practical resolution of the major-
ity’s apprehensions about the students’ safety was offered: the kirpan had 
to be sewn in the pocket of the student. The Supreme Court expressed 
doubts about the alleged fear for the safety of students and required con-
vincing evidence of danger, not simply projecting prejudices or 
ignorance to justify the claims of the majority.  
Amselem40 can be read the same way. One can note the same skepti-
cism toward the claims of aesthetic needs. Justice Iacobucci is severe in 
this regard:  
… protecting the co-owners’ enjoyment of the property by preserving 
the aesthetic appearance of the balconies and thus enhancing the 
harmonious external appearance of the building cannot be reconciled 
with a total ban imposed on the appellants’ exercise of their religious 
freedom. Although residing in a building with a year-long uniform and 
harmonious external appearance might be the co-owners’ preference, 
the potential annoyance caused by a few succahs being set up for a 
period of nine days each year would undoubtedly be quite trivial.41 
A comparison with Edwards Books42 is interesting in this regard: re-
call that Dickson C.J.C. had used section 1 to justify the constitutionality 
of the Ontario legislation, suggesting that the legislature could decide 
which day of the week was the most practical for a holiday if it was ac-
commodating, even sparingly, the minority.  
This short history of freedom of religion indicates that the ideals of 
diversity and tolerance explain the development of freedom of religion in 
Canada.43 They forged a “made in Canada” method of analysis about the 
issue that was particularly consistent with Canada’s history, and reflected 
a progressively deeper commitment to religious pluralism as an expres-
                                                                                                             
Differences. In its report, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (2008), the Commission 
advocates “open securalism” as the model to be pursued in Québec. See online at: <http://www. 
accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf>. 
39
 Supra, note 21. 
40
 Supra, note 28. 
41
 Id., at para. 86. 
42
 Supra, note 27. 
43
 For additional analysis, see Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Free Religions or Freedom from Re-
ligion? Canada, Federalism and Religion”, in Joseph Maria Garcia, Diversidad, derechos 
fundamentales y federalism (Barcelona: Atelier Libros juridicos, 2010) 185. 
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sion of multiculturalism. However, the work of Andrée Lajoie44 would 
invite us to consider that in approaching the majority-minorities debate 
and the will to “live together” in a tolerant and accepting pluralist soci-
ety, the Court will not go so far as to dramatically change the economic 
structure nor redistribute income. Andrée Lajoie suggests that the minor-
ity’s gains are mostly symbolic, and never stray too far from majoritarian 
values. Lajoie’s work may help explain how, as the ideas of tolerance or 
multiculturalism become more debatable, the ambivalence will find its 
expression in judicial decisions.  
III. THE DECISION IN HUTTERIAN BRETHREN, FREEDOM  
OF RELIGION AND MULTICULTURALISM  
The decision in Hutterian Brethren pits the small Alberta community 
of Hutterites who believe that the Second Commandment prohibits its 
members from having their photographs taken against a new requirement 
in Alberta that all drivers of motor vehicles be photographed. Like else-
where, Alberta requires that all persons who drive motor vehicles hold a 
driver’s licence and since 1974, each licence has borne a photograph of 
the licence holder, subject to exemptions for religious objectors such as 
the Hutterian Brethren. In 2003, the province adopted a new regulation 
and removed the exemption in order to put all the photographs in a facial 
recognition data bank. There were at the time about 450 exemptions, 
most of them members of Hutterian Brethren colonies. The province 
proposed two measures to lessen the impact of the universal photo re-
quirement but, since these measures still required that a photograph be 
taken for placement in the province’s facial recognition data bank, they 
were rejected by the members of the Wilson Colony. The Hutterian 
Brethren proposed instead that no photograph be taken and that non-
photo driver’s licences be issued to them marked “Not to be used for 
identification purposes.” When they could not reach an agreement, the 
Hutterian Brethren challenged the constitutionality of the regulation al-
leging an unjustifiable breach of their religious freedom. The Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association intervened in the case.45 The case proceeded 
on an admission that there was a violation of freedom of religion. All the 
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Alberta courts had found that the violation was not justified under sec-
tion 1 of the Charter. In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed.  
Chief Justice McLachlin and Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ. 
found that the regulation was justified under section 1, because it ensured 
the integrity of the driver’s licensing system and minimized the risk of 
identity theft. The universal photo requirement was deemed necessary to 
ensure that each licence was connected to a single individual, and to no 
more than one individual. Such was clearly a goal of pressing and sub-
stantial importance even if it was not strictly necessary to ensure safe 
driving on highways. The four judges found that the regulation satisfied 
the proportionality test: it was rationally connected to the objective, and 
exemptions from the photo requirement would increase the vulnerability 
of the system. They also found that there was no alternative that would 
similarly uphold the integrity of the system: any exemption would have 
the same effect. Even if there were over 700,000 Albertans who do not 
hold driver’s licences and whose pictures would never appear in the data 
bank, the majority suggested that the objective of the driver’s licence 
photo requirement was not to eliminate all identity theft, but simply to 
minimize it. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the accommodation 
approach and suggested that when the constitutional validity of a law 
was at stake, the doctrine of reasonable accommodation should not be 
used as an equivalent to the section 1 Oakes analysis.46 The government 
is entitled to justify the law, not by showing that it has accommodated the 
claimant to the point of undue hardship, but by establishing that the 
measure is simply rationally connected to a pressing and substantial goal, 
minimally impairing of the right and proportionate in its effects. The 
Court concluded as well that the effect of the violation were not so seri-
ous: the negative impact on the freedom of religion of Colony members 
who wish to obtain licences did not outweigh the benefits; they could 
hire cars or cabs and while this could impose a cost, there was no evi-
dence that this would be prohibitive.  
Justice Abella dissented, arguing that because more than 700,000 Al-
bertans had no driver’s licence, the benefit of adding the photographs of 
around 250 Hutterites was marginal. She saw the impact on the collective 
way of life of the Hutterites as significant and applying Dickson C.J.C.’s 
famous formulation,47 concluded that the mandatory photo requirement 
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was a form of indirect coercion that placed religious observers in the un-
tenable position of having to choose between compliance with their 
religious beliefs or giving up on their community’s self-sufficiency.  
Justices LeBel and Fish equally dissented, adding to Abella J.’s 
comments that the majority had minimized and understated the nature 
and importance of the impact on community life as an important aspect 
of the guarantee of freedom of religion. Skeptical about the ability to 
really prevent identity fraud through the mechanism of compulsory pho-
tos in digital facial recognition banks, LeBel J. suggested that allowing 
the limited number of exceptions would not unduly compromise the se-
curity of Alberta residents and that other alternatives existed to prevent 
identity theft.  
Generally, the decision in Hutterian Brethren can be viewed as a de-
parture from the critical assessment of majority rationales expressed in 
Multani or Amselem or from the the way even in which the Supreme Court 
in Edwards Books relied on exceptions to justify a legislative scheme that 
violated religious freedom. In the end, the decision in Hutterian Brethren 
validates a no-exception rule for an administrative decision whose democ-
ratic legitimacy, necessity and efficiency still have to be demonstrated. 
Several aspects of the decision could be discussed (the relaxed section 1 
approach at the minimal impairment stage48 or the tolerance for financial 
costs for the exercise of one’s religious commitments).49 I will focus on 
three aspects that have been less considered but that may illustrate a ten-
dency toward a decreased tolerance for difference: 
(1) The decision generously accepts secondary purposes to a legisla-
tion through a regulatory change. 
(2) The decision completely rejects a “duty to accommodate”  
approach for a government dealing with a religious minority.  
(3) The decision undermines a marginalized set of beliefs. 
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1. Acceptance of Secondary Justifications 
Courts have always been skeptical of changes to legislative pur-
poses. In Big M Drug Mart,50 the government had tried to argue that the 
Lord’s Day Act had a new purpose, not religious but social, to facilitate 
a common day of rest. Jutsice Dickson rejected that argument in the 
following terms, quoting from a Report from the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada: 
... it would seem apparent that any recharacterization of the Lord’s Day 
Act in a modern context so as to provide a clarification of the 
province’s role with respect to Sunday legislation is a task the 
Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures will have to take 
up directly.51 
In Alberta, the redefinition of the driving licence as an identity 
measure rather than a simple attestation of the capacity to drive did not 
occur through a legislative amendment (by the Alberta legislature) but 
rather by a regulatory change, which eliminated previous exemptions. 
Although one can presume that the increased budgetary costs to create 
the facial recognition data bank were approved by the legislature, the 
“new” and additional purpose of the Traffic Safety Act52 of Alberta was 
not approved by the legislature. Indeed, this was a point noted by Conrad 
J.A. at the Alberta Court of Appeal, writing for the majority.  
The Chief Justice dismissed this concern by considering that the 
problem of identity theft, and the legitimacy of attempting to curb it by 
the mandatory participation in the facial recognition data bank, was a 
“collateral effect”53 of having a driver’s licence scheme: 
The Province was entitled to pass regulations dealing not only with the 
primary matter of highway safety, but with collateral problems 
associated with the licensing system. It was therefore entitled to adopt a 
regulation requiring photos of all drivers to be held in a digital photo 
bank, thereby minimizing the risk of identity theft to the extent 
possible.54  
One should be concerned that such large deference is given to the 
executive branch acting without the approval of the legislative branch. 
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Typically, courts aim to enhance the democratic process by providing the 
other branches of government full opportunity to act in the context of 
their responsibilities. What would have been the loss to our democracy in 
requiring that the introduction of a digital photo bank, and the elimina-
tion of all exemptions from it, be the subject of public debates and 
legislative approval? This does not appear to be an undue burden on the 
government. During the legislative process, the Hutterian Brethren could 
have voiced their concerns in front of the legislative assembly. Other 
citizens may have also expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the 
digital photo bank. The problem of identity theft may have provoked the 
discussion of a larger range of options: changes in banking practices or in 
credit card companies security measures, for example.  
It might be dangerous to cavalierly accept secondary purposes de-
fined by regulation under the guise of protecting the integrity of an 
administrative scheme, and then treat them with deference equivalent to 
a legislative enactment: could a bureaucracy decide that a compulsory 
identity card is helpful and essential to ensure the integrity of the social 
benefits scheme? Of immigration programs? Could civil servants devise 
an invasive supervisory apparatus for parolees or people who are seeking 
a pardon in order to minimize the risk of fraud? Should that be done 
without legislative approval, and then sanctioned by the courts as a mere 
response to collateral effects of existing systems? Is requiring that such 
violations of rights be done legislatively the “height of formality”55 or 
democratic accountability?  
Neither dissenting judge discusses this issue. Justice Abella accepts 
that the objective is legitimate and LeBel J. focuses on the necessity to 
avoid rigidly defining the objective in a way that prevents a meaningful 
analysis of the alternatives. I certainly share his concerns: one should 
worry about a governmental objective to “reduce or eliminate crime”, 
and the consequence that any alternative that does not completely meet 
the objective will be discarded. Surely, this ought not to be the result of 
the Chief Justice’s analysis of minimal impairment. One would hope that 
future cases will continue to require that governments not define unat-
tainable goals as a way to escape accountability on the range of 
alternatives that they evaluate and the impact on rights and civil liberties 
that they inflict. This is particularly dangerous in the context of “secu-
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rity” objectives, where the perspective of security experts is often prem-
ised on a risk analysis where the long-term impact on other values, such 
as civil liberties, is not quantified and is generally undervalued: for many 
security experts, there can never be enough security, no matter what the 
costs.  
In conclusion, under this part, secondary purposes ought to be treated 
with less deference than primary ones, particularly when they have not 
been the subject of legislative debates. This will need to be developed in 
future litigation: it could also be that politicians ought to demand greater 
involvement in issues couched as mere regulatory exercises that affect 
citizen’s constitutional rights.  
2. Rejection of the Model of Reasonable Accommodation 
The decision in Hutterian Brethren will be known for its clear rejec-
tion of the model of reasonable accommodation when governments deal 
with individuals through legislation or regulation. The Chief Justice ex-
plains: 
Minimal impairment and reasonable accommodation are conceptually 
distinct ... 
 Where the validity of a law of general application is at stake, 
reasonable accommodation is not an appropriate substitute for a proper 
s. 1 analysis ... The government is entitled to justify the law, not by 
showing that it has accommodated the claimant, but by establishing that 
the measure is rationally connected to a pressing and substantial goal, 
minimally impairing the right and proportionate in its effects.56  
This is certainly correct. The model of reasonable accommodation is 
conceptually different than reasonable accommodation and is no substi-
tute for a proper section 1 analysis. However, despite the fact that the 
reasonable accommodation model has its faults, it allows for a dialogue 
between the government and the minority, and a mandatory exchange 
and consideration of the views of the minority. Although one understands 
the Court’s preference for the Oakes model that prevents a minority  
hijacking the process of defining the appropriate exceptions, one should 
worry about losing the obligation to consult that is implicit in the duty to 
accommodate. If, as was the case here, one group is particularly affected 
by a change in the law, it might be appropriate to consult and ensure that 
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its views are properly taken into account. Otherwise, one risks devising a 
section 1 process in abstract, indifferent or deaf to the preoccupations of 
the people directly affected, particularly, as here, when the process is 
regulatory and not legislative and where the opportunity for public  
discussions is minimal. 
Hopefully, the decision in Hutterian Brethren will not be read as a 
dismissal of the consultative process adopted by the Alberta government 
with the Brethren. This would be a tragedy. Many have suggested that 
section 1 ought to have a “procedural component”, one that recognizes 
that the process of devising alternatives, of valuing the pros and cons, of 
testing social sciences evidence cannot be done without some participa-
tion of the groups potentially affected. Although the Aboriginal context is 
very different because Aboriginal people’s claims to rights of self-
government and sovereignty are engaged in determining acceptable  
limits to ancestral rights, there is value in exploring the benefits of con-
sultation mechanisms as part of section 1, as R. v. Sparrow57 and 
subsequent cases have done for the justification of limitations on Abo-
riginal rights. Participation in governance, invitations to be heard and 
consultative mechanisms are ways in which minorities can enhance their 
sense of belonging as well as their voice within a polity. We need rich 
instruments to enhance democratic participation. As was the case here, 
the majoritarian “first past the post system” will not provide a voice nor 
will it provide representation to a small marginal group. A pluralist soci-
ety must give itself more sophisticated mechanisms of democratic 
participation that should be anchored in constitutional law. This is a ter-
rain for further exploration: it is to be hoped that the decision in 
Hutterian Brethren will not be seen as a fin de non-recevoir to such dis-
cussions.  
In the context of majority-minorities relationships in a multicultural 
society, the decision in Hutterian Brethren in its unambiguous and abso-
lute rejection of the reasonable accommodation model may prove 
unhealthy. The justification for the rejection of the reasonable accommo-
dation model seems to present a disembodied process, disconnected from 
the people who could potentially be affected by the legislation (even 
more so in the context of a regulation) and with no obligation to reach 
out and understand the potential impact: 
By their very nature, laws of general application are not tailored to the 
unique needs of individual claimants. The legislature has no capacity 
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or legal obligation to engage in such an individualized determination, 
and in many cases would have no advance notice of a law’s potential to 
infringe Charter rights.58  
Modern legislative processes should aim to have the capacity to as-
certain whether individuals or groups will be seriously affected by the 
law. Transparent processes and consultation mechanisms may also help 
in ensuring that the impact of the law is known before it is enacted. The 
Supreme Court seems to be suggesting a fairly esoteric legislative  
process, isolated and uninterested in its impact on voters or individuals. 
One would hope for more. Again, I would suggest that the regulatory 
process may offer less opportunity for public discussion and engagement, 
and indeed this may warrant a different assessment of the level of defer-
ence to be given to a governmental decision in that regulatory context. 
In summary, in the case of Hutterian Brethren, the Alberta govern-
ment had certainly engaged in a dialogue with the Hutterite community. 
It would be unfortunate if the outcome of the case was that it was no 
longer necessary for governments to engage in dialogue with minorities. 
On the contrary, participatory and consultative approaches with affected 
groups by governments should be valued by the Court and recognized as 
a prerequisite to exercising deference to government. Language to that 
effect or, at a minimum, an acknowledgment of the value of such discus-
sions with minority groups, would have been a welcome addition to the 
decision.  
3. Intolerance of Marginal Beliefs  
The Hutterites constitute a very small minority in Canada. The Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses are more numerous and more nationally distributed, but 
they nevertheless constitute a small portion of religious adherents in 
Canada. The decision in C. (A.), which involved the access by a Jeho-
vah’s Witness mature minor to autonomous medical decision-making, 
concludes by a more forthright respect for freedom of religion and reli-
gious preferences in the test for the “best interests of the child”. It 
remains to be seen whether lower court judges will indeed give weight to 
a mature adolescent’s wish to forego a recommended medical treatment. 
Will a medical decision seen by most as unpalatable ever be accepted as 
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in the best interest of a mature adolescent? Can our multicultural and 
pluralist society accept and respect marginal beliefs? 
The question is also raised in the decision in Hutterian Brethren, 
where the majority reasoning raises fear that Canadian society has 
reached a less tolerant phase of its history. Justice LeBel, in his dissent, 
worried that the majority was “belittling” the Hutterian Brethren’s be-
liefs.59 Justice Abella shared the same concerns.60 The majority decision 
in Hutterian Brethren reflects some language unsympathetic to the Hut-
terites’ religious freedom:  
• In the introduction, the majority refers to the fact that freedom of 
religion does not protect “trivial” burdens, and seems to express 
doubts as to the existence of a real interference with beliefs, but the 
Court must accept the concessions made by the Attorney General 
and the assumptions on which courts below had proceeded.61 
• The decision appears to recognize the threat that accommodation 
of non-mainstream beliefs would have on governments’ ability to 
implement social policy: “Much of the regulation of a modern state 
could be claimed by various individuals to have a more than trivial 
impact on a sincerely held religious belief. Giving effect to each of 
their religious claims could seriously undermine the universality of 
many regulatory programs … to the overall detriment of the com-
munity.”62 
• The facial recognition data bank is described as a “creative solu-
tion” to the “difficult”, “complex” problem of identity theft,63 and 
the government is not required to show that it will produce the 
forecast benefits.64  
• The response that the Hutterian Brethren can just hire a cab to get 
anywhere they need to go could be read as an inconsiderate dis-
missal of their way of life that trivializes the issue.65  
In my view, at stake was not so much the right or the privilege to 
drive but the concept of tolerance and the acceptance of exceptions as a 
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way of life in Alberta. It appears that the preference is for the imposition 
of a more homogenized view of society in search for an elusive security.  
Since religious pluralism partly symbolizes Canadian multicultural-
ism, it is not surprising that a more restrained version of religious 
toleration emerges when multiculturalism is under attack as it is now. 
Multiculturalism was once associated with a desirable cosmopolitan 
identity that would enhance Canadian life, but it is now often labelled a 
failure or a vehicle for the development of cultural ghettos. Indeed, if the 
majority decision in Hutterian Brethren is read in light of Lajoie’s 
work,66 it could signal not only an internalization of the criticism of gov-
ernment by the judges but the incorporation of what media have 
described as the new Canadian values: the “tougher Canada”, one where 
tolerance for difference is replaced with unequivocal demands for faster 
and more complete integration. The message of the “tougher Canada” 
could be an appeal to more homogeneity, more pride, less guilt, more 
flags, less money for multicultural events.  
In this context, the model of religious toleration is under stress: the 
decisions studied seem to discount what is perceived to be a marginal 
belief, attempting to narrow freedom of religion to the less taxing task of 
tolerating beliefs acceptable to the majority. Because the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and the Hutterian Brethren observe commandments that are alien 
to most Canadians, that is, refusals to accept necessary blood transfu-
sions and refusals to be photographed, their beliefs are undervalued. It 
appears that multiculturalism and freedom of religion accept difference, 
provided that it is not too different.  
One has a sense that there is a tightening of the multicultural model. 
Many have criticized the multiculturalism model as being more symbolic 
than real, à la Noblesse oblige, that is, more benevolent than transforma-
tive. It is as though even this lukewarm model is seen as too generous, as 
though the noblesse had obliged and was now tired of it. Is Hutterian 
Brethren the response to the backlash from Multani? Is it a redefinition 
of Canadian values with security trumping tolerance or solidarity? Much 
depends on the way in which it will be interpreted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Religion has always been a complex phenomenon for believers and 
non-believers alike. For believers, it represents a special relationship that 
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may structure one’s being. The way one works, dresses, eats, organizes 
one’s time, marries or not, saves, gives or spends, speaks out or stays 
quiet could well be inspired by the teachings of one’s religion. Being re-
ligious may at the same time foster a sense of community or feel like an 
oppressive or limited way to live; it can provide the possibility of engag-
ing with non-believers or isolate one from others. Whether one’s religion 
is popular, mildly adhered to or not, increases or decreases the complex-
ity of interacting with the secular world. For Christians in North 
America, life is relatively easy: the religious holidays define the working 
calendar; stores feature the appropriate reminders of religious obliga-
tions, and rituals are supported by the media and the cultural life. 
Minority religions, Islam and Judaism in particular, may be equally well 
integrated into the social life of a community depending on the density of 
the population in a particular region. Not so for the less popular religions, 
such as Jehovah’s Witnesses or Hutterites.  
For non-believers, religion may appear either irrelevant or very dan-
gerous: is it simply a private way for some people to manage their lives? 
Or does it more ominously threaten to transform democratic societies 
into theocracies where rights and freedoms would be curtailed? Does 
discrimination within religion, against women for example, justify or 
even compel interference with religious life and religious communities?  
In this context, the issue of religion is becoming more complex for 
governments as well: is it a part of the stable socio-cultural institutional 
structures as it once was? Is it a partner for social development? Is it a 
force to be ignored, managed, controlled or feared? Does it help or hin-
der social harmony and progress? All these questions will continue to be 
at the forefront of public debates. In this context of increased public 
anxiety, courts will continue to play a role in questions of religion. The 
way in which courts understand their role with respect to the interplay of 
governmental action and religion was the focus of this paper. 
“In a multiethnic and multicultural country such as ours….”: with 
these words, Iacobucci J. begins his explanation for rejecting the aes-
thetic objectives of condominium owners in favour of religious freedom 
in Amselem.67 The analysis of freedom of religion as an example or 
rather a battlefield for multiculturalism and diversity is becoming clearer.  
This paper sought to analyze the decisions of the Supreme Court in 
2009 in light of this conflation of ideas of freedom of religion and multi-
culturalism. It posits that freedom of religion and multiculturalism have 
                                                                                                             
67
 Supra, note 28, at para. 87. 
94 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
been mutually reinforcing but that there is a possibility that as commit-
ment to multicultural values diminishes, so will the protection of 
freedom of religion. This paper criticizes the decision in Alberta v. Hut-
terian Brethren, suggesting, first, that the reliance on secondary purposes 
of regulatory amendments (as opposed to legislative ones) is incompati-
ble with a protection of democratic values and respect for the role of 
Parliament and legislative assemblies; second, that the rejection of the 
accommodation model ought not to be interpreted as rejecting negotia-
tions and consultations with affected minority groups; third, that the 
protection of religious minorities, particularly the ones holding very 
marginal beliefs, raises particular challenges in the appreciation of pro-
portionality in a multicultural society. Religious beliefs are difficult to 
explain and attempting to justify them in the context of earthly concerns 
seems pointless. Hutterian Brethren is a decision that could be inter-
preted as demonstrating a significant shift in the protection of 
multicultural values in Canada. 
